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I. INTRODUCTION
The need to improve the administration of justice is not a recent
phenomenon. Its seeds were planted in antiquity. The Hebrews were
admonished in Leviticus to "do no unrighteousness in judgment," to show
no prejudice in favor of the poor, "nor favor the person of the mighty."'
Every person was to be judged on the scale of merit. In modern times, the
administration of justice in the United States-the procedural infrastruc-
ture of our legal system-has been a primary concern of the organized bar
and legal academia since Roscoe Pound's epic speech in 1906 on the
shortcomings of justice under our legal system.2
Some of the ills Pound diagnosed in the legal system of his day, such
as the prevalence of a "sporting" theory ofjustice, have been alleviated in
the intervening years. Unfortunately, other problems, such as inordinate
delay and expense in the disposition of cases, have thus far eluded cure.
These have been compounded by a host of new problems unimaginable
by even the most prescient legal observer in 1906. Several distinguished
legal commentators have discussed some of these problems and advanced
solutions to them.3 In commenting on trends in the administration of
justice, I shall seek to avoid trodding on analytical paths already blazed by
others. I approach my task more as a couturier forecasting what fashions
will unfold next season than as an oracle foretelling vaguely what the
future will bring.
Any prediction of the future course of events, even the immediate
future, is precarious. With 20/20 hindsight, one can see how reforms of
yesteryear have themselves come to clog the machinery of the administra-
tion of justice. For example, the concern of the framers of the
Constitution that local prejudice against out-of-state parties would result
in injustice led to the creation of federal diversity jurisdiction.4 In the
*Judge, Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The author expresses his appreciation to his law clerk,
Ronald Krauss, for his assistance in the preparation of Section II of this paper. Responsibility for the
views expressed herein is solely that of the author.
1. Leviticus 19:15.
2. R. POUND, THE CAUSES OF POPULAR DISSATISFACTION WITIITE ADMINISTRATION OFJiUSTICE
(1906), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 241, 273 (1964).
3. See, e.g., Friendly, The Federal Courts, in AMERICAN LAW: THE TmRD CENTURY 197 (B.
Schwartz ed. 1976); Kaufman, Judicial Reform in the Next Century in AMERICAN LAw: TIIETiltW
CENTURY 229 (B. Schwartz ed. 1976).
4. Mr. Justice Frankfurter succinctly stated the basis for federal diversity jurisdiction as the
belief, conscious or otherwise, that the courts of a state may favor their own citizens:
Bias against outsiders may become embedded in a judgment of a state court and yet not be
sufficiently apparent to be made the basis of a federal claim. To avoid possible
discriminations of this sort, so the theory goes, a citizen of a state other than that in which he
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early days of our nation, when the federal courts had little business and
xenophobia was not uncommon, granting the federal courts diversity
jurisdiction was an innovation that made considerable sense. Today,
however, as the caseloads of the federal courts have increased to staggering
numbers and local bias against out-of-state parties has waned with the
cementing of the bonds of nationhood, diversity jurisdiction has become
an anachronism that the federal courts can ill afford. Another
illustration of a reform that has gone awry is the liberalization of
discovery in civil cases. The unforeseen by-product of reformers' concern
for improving the quest for the truth has been an enormous increase in
litigation expense, delay, and other abuses which now suggest that this
reform is itself sorely in need of reform.
Change is inevitable in a dynamic society; it is natural in a progressive
administration of justice. Fundamental concepts of justice may be
eternal, but the delivery system must be shaped by the changing needs of
society. Vitality in the system can only be maintained if it responds to the
social and societal needs of the times. As Mr. Justice Cardozo observed,
"Needs that were narrow or parochiala century ago may be interwoven in
our day with the well-being of the Nation. What is critical or urgent
changes with the times."5  Many forces unquestionably enter the
confluence of today's social, economic, and legal currents to shape the
future of the administration of justice.
One evident force is the increasing litigiousness of our society as
manifested by the escalating resort to the courts to settle disputes. 6 A
second is society's heightened sensitivity to civil rights. This is reflected in
the civil rights legislation of the 1960s and the judicial resurrection of the
civil rights legislation of the Reconstruction era. A third is the increased
recognition of the rights of criminal defendants and prisoners. This
increased recognition has extended not only to the conduct of the police
and prison officials, but also to the conduct of virtually all stages of the
criminal process itself. A fourth is society's increasing concern with
personal health, safety, pensions, and retirement, reflected, inter alia, in
Medicare and Medicaid legislation, the Employment Retirement Income
is suing or being sued ought to be able to go into a wholly impartial tribunal, namely, the
federal court sitting in that state.
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 336 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Some litigants may
prefer to litigate in the federal courts because of better calendar control of cases and the expectation of
higher levels of damages.
5. 301 U.S. 619, 641 (1937).
6. The reasons for this are obscure:
[n]o evidence can be found to give adequate support to any theory fully accounting for the
rising rate of appeal in federal courts. At the present time the causes of litigation, like the
causes of many other forms of behavior, are too rich a mix to ie susceptible of scientific
methods of proof.
Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and
the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REv. 542, 547 (1969).
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Security Act of 1974, 7 and the Occupational Safety and Health Act.8
These four forces alone portend a continued increase in the volume and
complexity of cases for an already overburdened federal judiciary. 9
In order to counterbalance this trend, the courts of appeals have
initiated changes in their internal operating procedures to greatly increase
the number of cases which they are able to decide. These changes include:
(1) a reduction in cases slated for oral argument; 0 (2) a greater reliance on
central staff attorneys to screen all appeals for jurisdictional defects,
prepare memoranda of law and fact in appropriate cases, process and
monitor pro se matters, and assist in a variety of miscellaneous matters;
and (3) an effort to harness sophisticated computer technology to make the
dispensation ofjustice run more efficiently." The most significant change,
however, is the dramatic increase in the use of alternatives to the
traditional written opinion; for example, the Second Circuit's oral
decisions,12 the Third Circuit's judgment orders, and the Fifth Circuit's
Local Rule 2l.t3 These innovations also permit more judicial time to be
spent on complex and significant cases.
Emerging concerns that may require significant adjustment of our
present system of administering justice include energy conservation,
delivery of health care, protection of the disabled, and the rapidly growing
aged and retired segment of the population. Impinging on these concerns
are problems raised by automated data gathering and storage that
7. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. V 1975).
8. Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970,29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970). See also Clean AirAct, 42
U.S.C. § 1857 (1970); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. V 1975);
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (Supp. V 1975); Noise Control
Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4901 (Supp. V 1975); The Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of
1968, 42 U.S.C. § 263b (1970); Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972,7 U.S.C. § 136
(1976).
9. From 1962 to 1977 the number of federal appeals courtjudges rose by 24, contrasted against
a 327% increase in cases terminated. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTs, 1977
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 65a (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 ANNUAL REPORT].
10. In fiscal year 1977, 31% of the cases were decided solely on the briefs without oral argument.
Id. at 71.
II. The federal courts now have at their disposal computer research tools (the Lexis system), and
machines that transmit photocopies of printed material over telephone wires. The Third Circuit is
currently engaged in an experimental program testing the utility of a computerized word processing
and transmitting system. Thesystem allows a letter or opinion drafted by ajudge in his chambers to be
placed on the word processor unit, from which distant judges can then retrieve a print-out.
The states have also been quick to capitalize on the latest hardware. The State of Pennsylvania is
currently studying a process known as "computer-assisted transcription" in order to speed up trial
court record transcriptions and expedite post-trial motions and appeals.
12. 2D CIR. R. § 0.23.
13. That rule provides for affirmance without opinion when (1) ajudgment ofthe district court is
based on findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous, (2) the evidence in support ofajury verdict is
not insufficient, (3) the order of an administrative agency is supported by substantial evidence on the
record as a whole, or (4) no error of law appears. In the first II months of 1977, only 37% of all
dispositions were accompanied by published opinions. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF TilE UNITED
STATES COURTS, OPERATION OF CIRCUIT OPINION PUBLICATION PLANS DURING TIlE ELEVEN-MONTII
PERIOD ENDING NOVEMBER 30, 1977, at AppendLx A (1977).
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threatens undue invasion of privacy 14 and by the dramatic development
and utilization of sophisticated medical procedures and technology.'
5
II. THE CASELOAD EXPLOSION
The increasing pressure on the federal courts to maintain a high
quality decision-making process in the face of a crushing caseload has
raised doubts about the ability of the present court system to stand the
strain. Of the ameliorative proposals currently advanced, primary
attention has been focused on efforts to refashion the structure of the
federal appellate courts. Attention has been directed toward the appellate
courts because appellate cases have shown the sharpest surge in volume, 6
Unfortunately, not enough attention has been paid to the possibility of
alternative treatment of cases at the point of entry to the federal judicial
system.17  Appeal to the circuit courts is traditionally a matter of right in
the federal system. Except for appeals that are technically defective, the
circuit courts must decide appeals on their merits. The circuit courts lack
the discretionary certiorari review of the Supreme Court. For the reasons
expanded upon below, I believe that possible alterations in the present
appellate structure may be attended by a de-emphasis of the court as the
primary locus for the adjudication of disputes.
A. Proposals for a New Article III Tribunal
In 1971, Chief Justice Burger appointed a study group chaired by
Professor Paul Freund, under the auspices of the Federal Judicial Center,
to examine the administrative health of the Supreme Court. 8 Discover-
ing that only some five percent of the cases filed in the Supreme Court were
disposed of by full opinion,' 9 the Freund Committee was concerned that
the Supreme Court was wasting time deliberating on the selection of the
appeals to be heard when it could have been deciding cases on their legal
merits. As a remedy, the Freund Committee proposed a national court of
appeals. This court, to be comprised of seven active regional circuit
judges appointed on a rotating basis, would attempt to screen out
unworthy petitions for review, leaving for the Supreme Court only the
14. See generally Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
15. See generally proposed legislation in Note, The Tragic Choice: Termination of Care for
Patients in a Permanent Vegetative State, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 285 (1976). Some of the dangers are
imaginatively portrayed in Robin Cook's recent novel, Coma.
16. "Assembly line processes cannot sustain those virtues for which we have always prized
federal courts: scholarship, a generalist view of the law, wisdom, mature and dispassionate reflection,
and-especially important for the perceived legitimacy of judicial authority-careful and reasoned
explanation of their decisions." Bork, Dealing with the Overloadin Article III Courts,70 F.R.D. 231,
234 (1976).
17. See Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORN13LL L. RaV. 634 (1974),
18. See Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, Report, 57 F.R.D. 573 (1972).
19. In the 1971 term, 3,643 cases were filed; 143 cases were dispo,.ed of by 129 full opinions. Id.
at 579, 581.
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most pressing cases. This proposal promptly drew widespread resistance
and ground to a dead halt.
The caseload explosion in the federal circuit courts of appeals 0
prompted Congress in 1972 to establish a Committee on Revision of the
Federal Court Appellate System, chaired by then-Senator Roman
Hruska.21  There was also a realistic concern in legal circles that the
increase in volume and complexity of the caseload was "threatening to
convert [the courts of appeals] from deliberative institutions to processing
institutions, 22 especially in view of the precipitous decline in the
opportunity for oral argument and the sharp increase in the proportion of
cases disposed of without published written opinion.23 Furthermore, it
was widely perceived that the Supreme Court's limited ability to review the
merits of circuit court cases (approximately one percent of those decided
by courts of appeals) was producing instability and lack of uniformity in
the law.
The Hruska Committee recommendation for a national court of
appeals differed significantly from the proposal of the Freund Committee:
rather than acting merely as a screen for unworthy cases, it would handle
cases referred by the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals. In
particular, the national court would hear cases presenting conflicts in
decisions among the circuits and cases in legal fields the Supreme Court
found difficult to monitor, for example, copyright and patent law. This
proposal also failed to generate much support, primarily because it would
not have directly alleviated what was perceived to be the most pressing
problem-the workload of the courts of appeals.
From his vantage point as a former member of the court of appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, Attorney General Griffin Bell recognized the need to re-
lieve the federal courts from the exponential increase of their caseloads
over the past decade. He therefore created within the Department of
Justice the Office for the Improvement in the Administration of Justice.
Building upon the early proposals for the restructuring of the appellate
courts, that office, under the direction of Professor Daniel J. Meador, is
now circulating a tentative proposal for restructuring a part of the
appellate tier. Briefly, the proposal would remove from the docket of the
courts of appeals many intricate and intensively litigated cases,
particularly those in which the problem of forum shopping among the
circuits has arisen. The proposal recommends the creation of a new article
20. In 1962,4,823 cases were filed in the United States courts of appeals. In 1977, 19,118 cases
were filed, an increase of 296%. The number of Circuit Judges rose in that period from 78 to 97, yielding
a ratio in the growth of cases to increase ofjudges of almost 12 to 1. 1977 ANNUAL R'orT, supra note
9, at 65a.
21. See Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, The Geographical
Boundaries oj the Several Judicial Circuits: Reconunendations for Change, 62 F.R.D. 223 (1973).
22. Bork, supra note 16, at 233.
23. See note 10 supra.
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III court of appeals by merging the present Court of Claims and the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals. This new tribunal would be called
something like the Federal Court of Appeals. Itsjurisdiction would reach
well beyond that of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals; it would also include exclusive jurisdiction of all appeals
in patent, civil tax, and environmental cases24 from the United States
district courts and the Tax Court. Jurisdiction of this new court of
appeals would be predicated on subject matter rather than traditional
geographical limitations. Should such a court be created, amendatory
jurisdictional legislation affecting every circuit would no doubt be
required. Review would be in the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari.
Although there are strong differences of opinion in judicial circles
about the desirability of such a court, there is much that speaks in favor of
it. A broader range of jurisdiction than now exist:s in either the Court of
Claims or the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, would avoid the
problem of obeisance to professional interests that can plague a special
court with limited jurisdiction and a small, highly specialized bar.
Furthermore, with the addition of only a small number of new
judgeships, it could siphon off approximately 1300 cases per year now
handled by the circuit courts. The Meador proposal also recites the
uncertainties, ambiguities, and pitfalls that legal scholars and courts have
found in the substantive and judicial review provisions of the National
Environmental Protection Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, and observes that numerous conflicts have already
arisen in environmental matters. With these technical, highly com-
plicated statutes, confusion exists respecting the appropriate circuit court
of appeals for review. Creation of a federal court of appeals would end
this confusion and would also heighten congressional awareness that
enactment of complex federal statutes requires additional judges to resolve
the disputes engendered by such legislation.
B. Changing the Entrance Requirements for the Federal Courts
Although a new circuit court of limited jurisdiction might temporarily
ease the burden of the federal appellate courts, it would do little to stem the
rising tide of federal litigation at the gateway to the federal court system-
the district courts. A substantial number of cases now reaching the
district courts on appeal from administrative agencies25 are simply run-of-
24. Although the definition of"environmental cases" could be flexible, it would likely include
cases arising under such legislation as the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (Supp. V 1975), the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. V 1975), and the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4521 (1970).
25. In recent years, some of the most important, complicated, and sophisticated litigation has
emanated from federal administrative agencies, Congress having provided for dircct judicial review of
these agencies' decisions in the courts of appeals. Some of the more significant litigation arises under
environmental, water pollution, and energy legislation, the National Labor Relations Act, the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act.
[Vol. 39:791
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the-mill personnel cases. In the industrial relations world, these personnel
disputes would be treated by routine grievance machinery and arbitration.
In the past, personnel cases frequently reached the federal courts clothed
in the mantle of important civil rights issues, but the guiding principles
have now been fairly well established. Today, most civil service and other
personnel cases raise merely factual issues.
Additional sources for the deepening stream of litigation flowing from
the regulatory schemes enacted by Congress are "black lung" and other
Social Security cases.26 These cases, like personnel actions, rarely present
questions that go beyond factual issues developed at the administrative
hearing. Their disposition generally turns on the determination of the
facts under clear legal principles or the interpretation of an obscure, often
arcane, provision of the governing statute.
At present, litigants in personnel, social security, and "black lung"
cases often enjoy the opportunity for multi-tiered appeals with both
administrative and court review. For example, in Twiggs v. United States
Small Business Administration," a civilian employee of the Small
Business Administration claimed that her voluntary lateral transfer
between jobs in the agency, each carrying a GS-4 rating, was induced by
the misrepresentation of her superior. She alleged that she accepted a
lateral transfer to the loan division of the agency in the representation that
it would afford her a greater opportunity for advancement. When that
opportunity did not materialize and she continued to retain her rating as a
clerk-typist, she filed a formal grievance through counsel pursuant to
agency regulations.
The agency informed her by letter that after inquiry it had concluded
that she was never promised a position as loan assistant and that she was
reassigned at her own request. Her counsel thereupon notified the agency
that she desired to process further her grievance under the agency's rules.
The agency then referred the grievance to a hearing examiner who, after
notice to the parties of a time and place, conducted his investigation by
means of personal interviews with Twiggs in the presence of her counsel.
After first providing Twiggs' counsel an opportunity to review the
grievance file and to comment, the hearing examiner made written formal
findings of fact and found that Twiggs had failed to establish a reasonable
basis for her grievance and denied the relief sought. Having exhausted her
Appeals in these cases, of course, should continue to be heard in the present courts ofappeals or in the
court suggested by the Meador committee.
26. For the period ending December 31, 1977, "black lung" cases declined substantially,
although they can be expected to increase again in view of the liberalizing amendment enacted by
Congress in 1977 and pending legislation to permit the filling of two judicial positions in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, encompassing the Pennsylvania
anthracite coal area. On the other hand, other Social Security filings for the same period increased by
33.1 %-from 6,654 filings during the preceding 12 months, to 8,854 filings. ADM.NtSTPATIVE OFFICE 0:
THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS, JANUARY-DECEstoER 1977, at Table 9
(1978).
27. 541 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1976).
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administrative remedies, Twiggs then instituted an action in the United
States District Court requesting a reversal of the agency's decision. The
district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. Twiggs then
appealed to the United States court of appeals.
Such four-tiered review of nothing more than ordinary personnel
matters, Civil Service Commission cases, Social Security disabilities, and
Consumer Products Safety Act cases constitutes a heavy drain of judicial
time and resources. In recent years, agency hearing examiners have
assumed increased responsibility and are now known more prestigiously as
administrative law judges. It would appear that an expanded and
strengthened system of administrative law judges, in conjunction with
specific agency review commissions, should adequately dispose of the bulk
of these regulatory cases. In the interest of ensuring an impartial tribunal
free of agency influence, it would be appropriate to provide access to the
federal district courts. Review by courts of appeals would be by writ
of certiorari only to consider important questions of law. As former
Solicitor General Bork has stated,
An increasingly regulated welfare state generates an enormous amount of
litigation. The programs may have great social importance but the issues
presented are in large measure legal trivia. Nevertheless, we have
thoughtlessly moved this mass of litigation into the federal courts, without
regard to whether it belongs or what we are doing to those courts. 28
Reallocation of these cases would go a long way toward relieving the
current strains on the federal courts; it is an idea whose time has come.
Changes in the identity of adjudicative bodies will undoubtedly be
accompanied by changes in the very nature of the adjucative process.
Present trends indicate that cases now disposed of by judge and jury trials
will in the future be resolved by a variety of dispute-resolution processes.
Building on an arbitration statute enacted almost 150 years ago, the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in 1836 enacted a uniform system of
compulsory arbitration29 for all civil disputes, except those over real estate,
when the amount in controversy is $2,000 or less. These cases are first
heard by a board of three members of the bar whose award has the force of
a finaljudgment. The proceedings are informal and cases are heard and
disposed of promptly. The right to appeal from the award and to a de
novo jury trial is preserved, but there is a disincentive to appeal: before
appealing, the dissatisfied party must pay up to one-half of the arbitrator's
fee.30 The system is operated so effectively that recently the jurisdictional
limits have been raised to $10,000 in the more populous counties and
$5,000 in the less populous or rural counties.3 In 1977, an excess of
28. Bork, supra note 16, at 237.
29. The current Pennsylvania provisions on arbitration begin at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § I
(Purdon 1963).
30. Id. § 71.
31. Id. § 30 (Supp. 1978-1979).
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28,000 cases, slightly more than ten percent of Pennsylvania's total
dispositions, were resolved by statutory compulsory arbitration."2
Further evidence of the growing national utilization of the arbitration
process is the more than doubling of the number of cases handled by the
American Arbitration Association between 1971 and 1977-from 22,459
to 47,066. 33
This year the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, at the instigation of the United States Department of
Justice, has undertaken a one-year experimental program that closely
parallels the well-established Pennsylvania arbitration procedure,
although the jurisdictional amount in controversy can be very much
higher. Two other federal district courts, the Northern District of
California and the District of Connecticut, have also instituted similar
experimental programs.
In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, principally two broad
categories of cases are eligible for referral to arbitration: (1) suits in which
the United States is a party, only money damages are sought, the damages
do not exceed $50,000 exclusive of interest and costs, and the action is
brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act or the Longshoremen and
Harbor Workers Compensation Act; and (2) actions in which the United
States is not a party, only money damages are sought, the damages do not
exceed $50,000 exclusive of interest and costs, and jurisdiction is based on
certain specified statutes enumerated in the district court by its arbitration
rule. The arbitration panel consists of three lawyers, each of whom has
been admitted to the bar of the highest court of a state or of the District of
Columbia and the district court for at least five years. They each receive a
nominal, fiat fee per case and probably make a considerable financial
sacrifice but render the service out of a sense of professional obligation to
aid the court in the speedy, effective, and fair administration ofjustice. By
stipulation, the parties may agree to have the arbitration conducted by a
single arbitrator and they may elect to designate one who is not a lawyer.
Of course, arbitration is not the sole alternative to judicial disposition
of cases, and it will likely share in the future disposition of cases with other
dispute resolution mechanisms, such as mediation and pretrial screening.
Other processes, such as the operation of special medical malpractice
tribunals, might be tailored to meet the needs of particular kinds of cases. 4
Minor disputes, particularly those of a largely factual nature, might be
handled more efficiently and economically in community mediation
panels, consumer complaint boards, and neighborhood justice centers.
Family disputes could be resolved appropriately and effectively in family
conciliation tribunals. The quality of state magistrates might be improved
32. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF PENNSYLVANIA COURTS, 1977 REPORT 31 (1977).
33. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, 1977-1978 ANNUAL REPORT (1978).
34. See Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. Ill (1976).
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and their jurisdiction expanded. The development of these mechanisms
should leave the courts more time to adjudicate matters of a more complex
nature.
Finally, it seems evident that the most radical approach to reducing
the case load in the federal courts-withdrawing jurisdiction-may soon
be implemented by curtailing diversity jurisdiction." The agitation in
recent years to abolish federal diversity jurisdiction totally has been
unsuccessful, but there is considerable promise that the seeds of abolition
planted in the past may bear fruit in the near future. Congress has been
considering several bills that will terminate substantially all diversity
jurisdiction. These appear to have solid support in the three branches of
federal government, the organized bar, the state courts, and academia.
If one of these bills is not enacted, another bill sponsored by the
Department of Justice is predictably certain to pass. It will curtail diversity
jurisdiction to the limited extent of depriving plaintiffs of access to the
federal courts in the state of their residence. This compromise is a response
to those trial lawyers who believe that a plaintiff all too frequently cannot
obtain a fair trial of a foreign forum.
The amount-in-controversy requirement in federal question cases
also has been under attack. The changing times appear to require its
complete surgical excision from an anatomy of federal jurisdiction, In
1976, Congress took the first step in achieving this therapeutic result. It
amended 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to provide that no amount in controversy is
required in any federal question case instituted against the United States,
any agency thereof, or any officer or employee of the federal government in
his official capacity. The $10,000 amount-in-controversy requirement
remains, however, in suits arising under federal common law, civil rights
suits against municipalities, and suits challenging certain aspects of state
law. The House Judiciary Committee has proposed legislation totally
abolishing the amount requirement in all federal question cases. This
rational improvement is not expected to have any appreciable effect on the
caseloads in the federal courts.
III. A POTENTIAL NEw BURDEN: SENTENCING REvIEW
Although considerable concern has been expressed and some
movement is visible to relieve the courts from the constantly increasing
caseload, the chief imponderable in this area is the volume of new litigation
that may be spawned by future legislation. A proposal under discussion
for many years and currently attracting respectable attention is to allow
appellate review of criminal sentences. Mounting concern about
35. For the 1977 judicial year, 31,678 diversity cases, comprising almost 25% of the civil
caseload, were filed in federal district courts. In the same year, 1,714 diversity cases, approximately
1 1% of the appellate caseload, were filed in the courts of appeals. 1977 ANN tAL REPORT, 31pra note 9,
at A-10, C-2.
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substantial disparities in the sentences of similarly situated offenders and
arbitrary and capricious sentencing has produced considerable support
for appellate review of sentences. The task of reviewing criminal
sentences, however, may be the torpedo that will ultimately sink the
appellate courts.
Perhaps the day for sentencing reform is long past due. The failure of
the rehabilitative purposes of a sentence is now commonly acknowledged.
Sentencing is a complex, burdensome, and worrisome problem.
36
Thrusting the enormous task of reviewing sentences upon the appellate
courts could more than counterbalance all efforts to alleviate their
caseload. Other alternatives should be explored first. Disparities in
sentencing might be avoided by using judicial sentencing councils in the
nisi prius courts. Sentencing councils are usually panels of three judges,
consisting of the trial judge and two other judges of the same court or
judicial district. The sentencingjudge bears the ultimate responsibility for
imposing sentence but he confers with his colleagues in determining the
appropriate sentence to be imposed. Sentencing councils could provide
the distillation of serious thought and experience by judges operating at
the sentencing level; councils could draw upon the combined expertise of
the judges and in due time should fashion standards to give sentencing
greater consistency and fairness. If the sentencing judge or council were
also required to articulate reasons for sentences and if a common law of
sentencing were thus to emerge, the felt injustices in disparate sentences
should be substantially reduced.
Some of the federal district courts are experimenting with varying
types of sentencing councils. The Federal Judicial Center has been
studying four of the United States district courts-Northern Illinois,
Eastern New York, Eastern Michigan, and Oregon- to ascertain whether
the range of variation in sentences has been significantly reduced following
the adoption of their council sentencing procedure. A sentencing council
approach is also contained in the proposed Kennedy-McClellan Federal
Criminal Code.37 Another partial solution may be determinate sen-
tencing in every case. A third possibility may be to relieve the judiciary
of the onerous and awesome responsibility altogether by assigning
sentencing to administrative tribunals specially equipped to deal with the
needs of the convict and society. This tribunal, composed of a lawyer, a
psychologist, a social worker, and a trial judge would fix the term of
sentence and character of treatment. Besides having the benefit of the
composite intelligence, experience, and expertise of a specialized group,
36. Judge Arin Adams recently expressed his cogent views on the need for a sentencingjudge to
articulate the reasons for a sentence. United States v. Bazzano, 570 F.2d 1120, 1130 (3d Cir. 1977)
(Adams, J., concurring).
37. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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the tribunal could act on the basis of reports submitted by social workers,
probation officers, and interested parties.38
Dean Norval Morris, speaking at a special Sentencing Conference in
June 1977, appropriately predicted that the sentencing reform journey
would not be short:
[T]here may be unfortunate detours through legislatively fixed sentences, but
in the longer run we can reasonably expect a small reduction of crime and
juvenile delinquency and, of at least equal importance, we can also
reasonably expect the emergence of a principled, even-handed, effective yet
merciful Common Law of Sentencing, consistent with human rights and
freedoms, competent to the deterrence of crime, the adumbration of
minimum standards of behavior and the better protection of society against
its in-group predators.39
IV. IMPROVING COMMUNICATIONS
A promising development in the administration ofjustice is improved
communications among courts, the bar, and the public. Better
communications should reduce the mysteries of the judicial process and
improve the confidence of the bar and public in the integrity of the courts
and the operation of the judicial system. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit broke new ground in this area when it
recently developed formal Internal Operating Procedures. The publica-
tion and wide distribution of these Procedures by the court to the bench,
bar, and administrative agencies met with highly favorable reaction.
A court's publication of its internal operating procedures provides
accountability for the court's administrative process and procedures. It
offers an insight into the time constraints of the court, the reasons for the
temporal requirements of the rules of court, the criteria by which oral
arguments are allocated or denied, and the painstaking care with which
opinions are circulated within the court. The bench and bar also are
advised when they might expect full length opinions and under what
circumstances the court would dispose of appeals by per curiam opinions
or by judgment orders. This accountability to the bench, bar, and public
by the adoption, publication, and distribution of formal rules for internal
operating procedures should avoid the frequently leveled criticism that
courts unnecessarily enshroud themselves in utter secrecy.
Another signal development in improving the channels of com-
munication between bench, bar, and public is the creation of lawyers'
advisory committees to the courts. Such committees should provide a
vehicle for complaints and suggestions by lawyers and litigants; they
should aid in the formulation of internal operating procedures, rules of
practice, and in the improved efficiency of the courts. These committoes
38. See Comment, Appellate Review of Sentences: A Survey, 17 ST. Louis U.L.J. (1972).
39. Morris, Conceptual Overview and Commentary on the Movement Toward Determinaey, in
SPECIAL CONFERENCE ON DETERMINATE SENTENCING, SUMMARY REPORT 1, 5 (1978).
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should also bolster confidence in the judicial system. The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals established such a committee in 1976. The committee
consists of active, seasoned practitioners at the federal bar of each district
court who are appointed for terms of three years. When he informed the
members of the committee of their appointments, Chief Judge Seitz
advised them that their principal function would be twofold: (1) to receive
from the court, from time to time, matters on which the committee's
reactions, advice, or recommendations are sought; and (2) to communicate
with the court concerning any matters touching the administration of
justice in the circuit. The committee serves diligently and effectively. It
provides valuable suggestions, performs important studies, and is a
valuable two-way conduit for communication. It should enhance
confidence in the court and improve the administration of justice.
The creation of a lawyers' advisory committee also implements a
suggestion made several years ago by the American Bar Association
Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration for a procedure that
would provide opportunities on the part of members of the public and the
bar to suggest, review, and make recommendations concerning proposed
rules.40 The Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and for the
Seventh Circuit also have recently adopted rules creating advisory
committees on procedures. The Office for the Improvement of
Administration of Justice has been so impressed by the value of the
lawyers' advisory committee that it is considering a proposal that these
committees be required by statute in every circuit. Legislation appears to
be unnecessary, however, since the committees can be established more
readily and their functions formulated and altered more flexibly by
rules of court without the rigidity that a statute would entail.
V. CONCLUSION
Henry Steele Commager, the distinguished Amherst historian, once
wrote that although most of the political institutions Americans inherited
from abroad were speedily modified by environment to produce something
characteristically American, "law successfully resisted environmental
modification. . . .Resourceful and ingenious in politics, Americans
were content in the legal field to abide by familiar formulas."'A Any
aversion, however, that nineteenth-century Americans may have had
toward change in the administration of justice subsided in the twentieth
century under the telling blows of legal scholars led by Holmes, Pound,
and Brandeis. The mechanical jurisprudence of the nineteenth century
40. COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORGANIZATIONS §§ 1.30-.31 (1974); see also SECTION OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, COOPERATION WITi LAYMEN IN IMPROVING TIlE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1952).
41. H. COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN MIND 359 (1950).
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gave way in this century to what Holmes described as sociological
jurisprudence and an administration of justice that is being shaped to the
needs of the times.
The call for change unleashed by Pound's powerful message to the
bench and bar in 1906 continues to reverberate. The sudden, upward
surge in litigation during the past decade, especially in the number of
appeals, took the legal community by great surprise. The numbness
resulting from that stunning development, however, has begun to wane.
One can sense a concerted, constructive movement by the total legal
community, including academia, to shape the system to the demands of the
hour. The Office for the Improvement of the Administration of Justice
will be presenting us from time to time with the products of their research
and study. A large and growing segment of the judiciary is alert and
receptive to constructive proposals that would permit the courts to adapt
themselves to changing societal requirements. As I have indicated, judges
themselves are probing for new solutions to old problems. Some of their
proposals should soon bear fruit in the form of new tools to assist courts in
the effective, fair, and speedy disposition of justice.
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